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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE P. ~fARTIN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
R.A.LPH L. JONES, d/b/a Mountair 
Pharmacy, 
Respondent. 
No. 7766 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Responden_t hereby respectfully petitions the court 
to set aside its decision in the above entitled cause and 
to grant a rehearing thereof on the following grounds: 
.1. _ The court has misapplied the law by holding, in 
effect, that, assuming appellant to have been a tres-
passer, respondent owed him a duty greater than that· 
to which a trespasser is entitled. 
2. The court in effect enlarges the duty owing by a 
possessor of land to a treS'passer beyond the duty here-
tofore defined by the· unanin1ous decisions of the courts 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and makes indistinguishable the duty oWing to tres .. 
passers and invitees. 
3. The decision opens the door to all kinds of claims 
by persons having no right to go upon t~1e premises and 
\vho, as a result of their trespassing, may be injured by 
an artificial condition which may suit the convenience 
and purposes. of the owner of the property, and which. 
condition he ought to have a right to maintain as .such 
owner even though the same might be dangerous to 
trespassers. 
4. The court has disregarded entirely the element 
of appellant's contributory negligence, which, even under 
the unusual rule of liability announced by . the court, 
justified the verdict of the jury. 
ARGU~fENT 
OWNER'S LIABILITY TO TRESPASSER 
Who is a trespasser~ The court has said : 
''A trespasser is defined as a :person ·who 
. enters or remains upon land in possession of an-
other without a privilege to do so created by the 
possessor's consent or otherwise.'' In Re Wim-
mers Estate, 111 ·Utah 444, 182 Pac. (2d) 119. 
In his opinion Justice Wolfe assumes that the plain-
tiff w:as a trespasser and he departs from the rule estab-
lished by the decisions of the courts to follow. the aca-
demic statement in the "Restatement Of The Law Of 
Torts'·', which, we submit, if given practical application 
virtually makes the possessor of real property an insurer 
of .the safety of all persons \vho, having no right to 
.2 
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go upon his property, are injurL.lll by 8otue <:'ondi t ion 
which, though it n1ay be dangerous to such trespasser, 
the o'vner desires for his o"ll conYenienrt:' to maintain. 
In other words, the o'Yner n1ust so Inaintnin his premi~PH 
that those 'vhom he has not invited to come upon them, 
and 'vho have no right there, "·ill be :protected against 
injury. Is that to be the la\Y of this state sin1ply upon 
the authority of the text referred to and in disreg"ard 
of the time-honored principles by "·hich a trespasser 
has always been held to assume all ·risks of his tres-
pass except the risk of "·anton or \Yilful injury by the 
owner of the property)? \V·e respectfully submit that 
this court should not a~andon the old rule which respe-cts 
the right of a person to maintain his qwn propert~ as 
he sees fit as against persons \vho have no business to 
go upon it, and yet which justly gives a trespasser· a 
right of action for wanton or wilful injury by such owner. 
One .owes trespassers no duty to keep his property 
in a safe condition for their use. Ruocco v. ·United A.dver-
tising Corp. (Conn.), 119 Atl. 48. 
A trespasser must accept the existing condition of 
the premises· as he finds them. Printy v. Reimbold 
(Iowa), 202 NW 122; Pettyjohn v. Basham (Va.), 100 
SE 813. 
A trespasser can recover nothing from the prop-
erty owner for injuries resulting from the condition of 
the premises although it exists through the owner's 
carelessness. Hu.mphery v. Gas Company (Vt.), 139 Atl. 
440, 56 ALR 1011. 
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· The only duty owed to a trespasser is to refrain 
from \vilful and intentional injury or from active negli-
genc~~ Frederick v. Railroad Comp!any (Wis.), 240 NW 
387. 
No liability f.or injury to a trespasser can be founded 
upon either ordinary or gross negligence; to impose such 
liability there must have been a wilful, wanton or reck-
less act. Ciarmataro v. Adams (11f.ass.), 176 NE 610, 75 
ALR 1171. 
A trespasser upon the property of another cannot 
recover for defects, obstructions or pitfalls upon the 
premises unless the injury shall result from wilful or 
wanton negligence. Brighan~ v. F,isk-·Carter Co1npany 
(N. Carolina), 136 SE 125. 
One who enters the prenlises of another as a tres-
passer does so at his o'vn risk and the owner owes him 
no duty to keep the premises in a safe condition. His 
only duty is to abstain from 'Y~nton or wilful injury. 
Giannini v. Campodonico (Cal.), 22 Pac. 256; llerzog v. 
Hemp1hill (Cal.), 93 Pac. 36; Roberts v .. Pacific Electric 
Company (Cal.), 283 Pac. 353; Dem1ner v. City of Eureka 
(Cal.), 178 Pa.c. (2d) 472. 
If the rule announced in these and other authorities 
is to be disregarded, it will mean that in Utah, tres-
passers 'vill have rights of action which heretofore, 
bench and bar alike, have never believed they had a 
right to assert. If an owner chooses to maintain an 
artificial condition 'vhich is dangerous, the rule of the 
text quoted by Justice Wolfe imposes upon such O\\rner 
the duty to act as guardian of trespassers to keep away 
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from such dangers. The O\vner must ''exercise reason-
able eare'' to \Yarn a trespasser if the owner knows 
or ought to have known that such trespasser is near the 
danger, or if the ovvner has reason to believe that the 
trespasser .will not d~iscover the danger. Under such a 
rule a trespasser ean al,vays assert that the owner ought 
to have knovvn that he, the trespasser, would not ~ikely 
discover, and that he did not discover the danger, and 
therefore the owner was negligent for failure to keep 
his premises safe for fear the tresp·asser. would not 
discover the dangerous condition. Or, if the owner ou.ght 
to ha.L~e known {vvhether or not he actually knevv) that a 
trespasser was in close proximity to the danger, the 
o\vner is liable if he fails to warn such tres~passer. 
\\T e respectfully contend that the rule announced in 
the Restatement ought not to be adopted as the law of 
th~s state. It is a theoretic~! refinement and a repudia-
tion of the safe and sane rule which judicial tribunals 
have adhered to and enforced from time immemorial. 
This new rule imp·oses ~n unfair obligation on property 
owners and it possesses no virtue just because it is new, 
or because it is intended as a progressive conception as 
to a property owner's duty to trespassers. 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
There is another reason why the court erred in its 
decision. The evidence of contributory negligence of ap-
pellant is entirely disregarded. Here are the facts: 
1. App.ellant had been in respondent's store ·on 
numerous occasions. lie knew that customers did not 
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frequent the aisle in the liquor department. He had 
never seen any customers go into said aisle. (R. 63) 
· 2. There vvas a vyarning sign at the very entrance 
to this aisle, '' }.J o · Admittance - Ernployees OnJy' '. 
(Defendant's Exhibits 3 _and 8) 
3. It was 9:30 at night ·of a holiday when the liquor 
department was entirely closed (R. 52), and it "\Vas not 
an area of the premises which customers had any right, 
expr.ess · or ·implied, to handle goods then, or ·at any 
time. (Defendant's Exhibit 2) 
4. Even though appellant states that he was in-
formed .PY the clerk that the pencils were above the 
shelves containing the liquor bottles (R. 43), the jury 
had a right to disbelieve such staten1ent and to accept 
as true the denial of the ·clerk. ( R. 186-7) In any event, 
no ~easonable person would intrude himself into such 
part of. the premises to retrieve a pencil from a seven-
. foot shelf in disreg~rd of the warning sign and when 
he already had observed and understood that it was not 
customary for any person to enter that :part of the 
prem1ses. 
5. · The evidence is conclusive that the aisle w·as 
well lighted (R. 203) and that appellant, if· he had 
exercised any care for his safety, would not have fallen 
to his injury. 
6. The danger was as obvious to appellant as to 
respondent's employee. He was in the aisle before the 
clerk \\rent in and had a1nple opportunity t·o note the 
condition of the premises. 
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Justice ''rolfe declares : 
''By the respondent's ·own evidence, the ap-
pellant did not walk behind the liquor counter and 
fall do,vn the duinb~,vaiter shaft without first 
being· seen and discovered by one of the respond..: 
ent 's en1ployees. One of the clerks noticed the 
ap:pellant behind the liquor eounter before his 
fall, and in fact 'vent over to serve him. By her 
own testimony, she (the clerk) was standing at 
the side of the appellant for 'a few minutes' be-
fore he fell down the ·shaft.'' 
Do these recited facts make appellant any less the 
trespasser~ Bear in ruind that he went into the aisle 
,v-hile ~Irs. Ashley_ was in anothe-r part of the store. 
Now suppose as so-on as she entered the ·aisle· she ha.d 
said, '• Can't you read the sign, 'No Admittance - For 
E1nployees Only'-~ You are· not allowed here. Please 
leave.'' And suppose he had then fallen into the shaft. 
Would r-espondent h·ave been in any better position~ 
Would such conduct_ .. on the part of the clerk have 
strengthened respondent's defense~ · Why, . then, was 
ap·pellant less negligent because the cl-erk was courteous 
enough not to offend him~ Should he be ·advantaged 
by her courtesy in failing to offend him~ Competi_tion 
in business is too keen to warrant ·clerks in criticizing 
the conduct of patrons. Under the- rule announced by 
the court, if appellant had been ordered from behind the 
counter he 'vould still have been entitled to a warning 
of his proximity to the shaft, or to have reli·ed upon 
the duty of respondent to know that the shaft (the arti-
ficial condi tioiQ was or rnight · be dangerous to him, a 
trespasser. 
~ 
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Will the court please again inspect the defe·ndant 's 
Exhibits 3 and 8 ~ They clearly reveal that the curtains 
covered the stock of liquor, and that the liquor depart~ 
ment of the store was not open for business. Please 
observe the "N·o Ad1nittance" sign in plain view; also 
the ver:y narrow passage,vay into the aisle through 
which appellant entered,--~another suggestive ''No Ad-
mittance'' warning to all but employees. Then as shown 
on Exhibit 3, ovserve the distance-. 12 to 15 feet, ap-
p·ellant had to walk down the aisle with ample oppor-
tunity to observe and ·with the duty to ·observe the con-
dition of the floor which the uncontradicted evidence 
shows was well lighted. Assuming respondent owed 
appellant the duty to kno\v, at his peril, that the artificial 
condition of the premises would likely be dangerous to 
appellant, or that respondent owed the duty, in addition 
to the warning sign, t·o give him further w-arning of the 
dangerous condition, we say, assuming ·either of these 
alternatives, if appellant's conduct did not ·constitute 
contributory negligence what element is lacking to show 
his negligence~ The jury evidently considered him neg-
ligent. It is reasonable to so. conclude, and if he \Vas 
negligent a different instruction from that complained 
of would not have 1produced, and ought not to have pro-
duced, a different verdict. 
We most respectfully submit that this ·court has 
committed a grave error ·and a grave injustice to this 
respondent in setting aside the jury's verdict in view 
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of the record in this case and that it ought, in the inter-
est of justice, to grant a re-hearing. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON 
E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
g. 
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